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Abstract 
The efficacy of situational crime prevention is premised on the assumption that crime 
occurs as a result of a person-situation interaction (Clarke 2008). However, it is 
argued in this paper that just what is meant by an interaction between person and 
situation is not always made clear in the situational crime prevention literature. There 
are two distinct meanings of interaction in this context. The first meaning – the sense 
in which the term is most often used in relation to situational crime prevention – is 
that the relationship between the person and the situation is reciprocal. An 
individual’s behaviour is affected by and in turn affects his/her immediate 
environment. The second meaning – which has received less explicit attention in the 
situational crime prevention literature – is that the relationship between the person and 
the situation is interdependent. The effect of the immediate environment on behaviour 
depends upon the individual in question. Giving consideration to the full meaning of 
the person-situation interaction provides a more nuanced account of the role of the 
immediate environment in criminal behaviour.   
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The enduring contribution that Ron Clarke has made to the field of crime prevention 
is to highlight the role of the immediate micro-environment in the performance of 
criminal behaviour. He was one of the first to see the potential that the manipulation 
of situational factors offered for intervention at the level of environmental design. 
Better than anyone else, Clarke was able to translate the logic of situational 
prevention into a comprehensive set of concrete, practical and effective interventions 
that were accessible to in-the-field practitioners. 
 
Clarke’s model of prevention is built on a solid psychological principle. During the 
1960s, the decade before Clarke’s first writings on situational prevention appeared 
(Clarke & Martin 1975), one of the most vigorous debates in psychology concerned 
the cross-situational consistency of personality traits. Traditional dispositional 
personality theorists conceptualised traits as generalised behavioural tendencies that 
predicted how individuals behaved across different areas of their life. Someone who 
was aggressive in one situation was seen to be likely to be aggressive in many other 
situations as well. A person performs aggressive acts because he/she has an 
aggressive trait. Behavioural theorists, notably Walter Mischel (1968), argued instead 
that behaviour is highly variable and is a response to different situational demands 
and expectations. A person can be aggressive in one circumstance and not in others 
depending upon the context. It is the situation that causes the behaviour not the 
person. The variability of behaviour makes the very notion of a trait unsustainable. 
This theoretical position in known as situationalism.  
 
As is the case with many debates, it soon became apparent that the truth lay 
somewhere in the middle. The correlation between measures of personality traits and 
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their related behaviours is typically found to be in the order of .4 (Nisbett 1980), a 
strength of association that can be described as medium. The size of this correlation 
suggests that behavioural patterns develop around stable trait cores, while the level of 
unexplained variance is evidence for the role of situations in the behavioural 
expression of traits. Most personality theorist now agree that the performance of 
behaviour is best understood as the result of an interaction between dispositional and 
situational factors.  
 
It is the person-situation interaction that ultimately explains the efficacy of situational 
interventions in crime prevention (Cornish & Clarke 2008; Clarke 2008). If crime is 
the product of both the characteristics of offenders and the locations in which they 
commit their crimes, then addressing the situational side of the equation is at least as 
valid as is the traditional focus on attempting to change offenders’ dispositions. 
Moreover, given a choice there are distinct advantages in preferring to focus 
prevention efforts on the situational characteristics of the crime event rather than on 
the psychological characteristics of the offender. As a general principle proximal 
causes exert more direct and modifiable effects on behaviour than do distal causes 
(Clarke 2008; Ekblom 1994).  
 
The focus of this paper is not on the relative importance of the person and the 
situation in behaviour, but on the on the word ‘interaction’. An interaction means 
more than that dispositions and situations are both important in the commission of 
crime. The Penguin Dictionary of Psychology gives two possible meanings for 
interaction as it relates to behaviour (Reber, Allen & Reber 2009). An interaction may 
refer to a ‘reciprocal effect or influence’ or to instances in which ‘the effect of two (or 
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more) variables are interdependent’. Confusingly, both of these definitions have been 
used with respect to person-situation interactions in situational crime prevention, 
typically without the difference between the two meanings being made clear.  
 
Interactions as reciprocal relationships  
An interaction as a reciprocal relationship is the most common usage of the term in 
everyday language. Central to this concept of interaction is the idea of bidirectional 
causation. According to this definition, in a person-situation interaction the 
environment affects the individual and the individual in turn affects the environment 
(Figure 1). The morning alarm rings and the waking person fumbles to press the 
snooze button. Immediate environments can include other people such that the 
behaviour of one person acts as the stimulus for the behaviour of another.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
Applying this definition in its broadest sense, virtually all criminal behaviour (indeed, 
all operant behaviour) can be said to arise through a person-situation interaction. 
Looking at situational effects on the person, the impact may occur at the motivational, 
cognitive and behavioural level. First, the very impetus to offend may be created by 
situational pressures and provocations. A crowded, airless nightclub may induce stress 
that increases the probability of aggression (Homel & Clark 1994). Next, the decision 
of the motivated offender to proceed with an offence is governed by an assessment of 
the opportunities offered by the situation. A burglar will select a house showing signs 
that the owner is away over a house showing signs of occupancy (Macintyre 2002). 
Finally, the precise modus operandi adopted by the offender is a direct response to the 
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particular situational contingencies encountered. The type of sex acts performed on 
victims by child sex offenders depends upon the age and gender of the child (Leclerc, 
Proulx, Lussiere & Allaire 2009). Looking at the other side of the equation, an 
interaction then requires that there is an overt response to these situational influences 
that acts in some way upon the immediate environment. The consequences of crime 
can almost always be measured in terms of situational impacts – a victim is harmed, 
property is damaged or removed, an illegal pornographic image is downloaded, a 
syringe is emptied, and so on.  
 
More interestingly, interactions defined by reciprocity are typically not single events 
but are iterative processes in which the outcome of one action affects the next action, 
the outcome of which affects the next action, and so on. Thus, a conversation between 
friends is an iterative interaction – each response is a reaction to the previous response 
(assuming the participants are listening to each other). So too is the playing of a 
computer game where the actions of the player determines the playing strategy 
adopted by the computer program and vice-versa. Cornish (1994) makes the point that 
the crime event is a multi-staged process comprising a beginning, middle and end. 
Crime does not involve a single decision by the offender, but instead there is a 
connected chain of decisions based on an ongoing evaluation of the available options. 
The crime event unfolds as a dynamic process and may take many different paths 
depending upon the nature of the environmental feedback.  
 
Iterative person-situations interactions can be fitted within a multi-staged crime-event 
framework. Indermaur (1996), for example, examined the interactions between 
robbers and their victims. He interviewed 88 perpetrators and 10 victims of violent 
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property crime about the progression of the offence from beginning to end. The 
behaviour of the perpetrator depended upon the reactions of the victim. In particular, 
signs of resistance from he victim were pivotal points in the transaction inducing in 
perpetrators a sense of ‘righteous indignation’. Indermaur advised victims of violent 
crime to adopt non-confrontational responses to the robber’s actions in order to reduce 
the violence of the offence.   
 
I suspect that for most writers and practitioners in the situational crime prevention 
field, the reciprocal relationship that an offender has with his/her immediate 
environment is the main way that the person-situation interaction is interpreted. While 
I have no issue with the validity of this interpretation, it needs to be recognised that 
this is just another way of describing the situationalism proposed by Mischel (1968) 
and other behaviourists. The person-situation interaction in this sense is a within-
individual phenomenon – the nature of the individual changes according to the 
situation he/she is in. This process takes no account of the role that stable individual 
differences play in behaviour. As figure 1 suggests, behaviourists make no distinction 
between the person and their behaviour. Incorporating a role for personal traits into 
the person-situational interaction is a necessary step in the resolution of the debate 
between dispositionalists and situationalists. This brings us to the concept of 
interaction as the interdependence of variables.  
 
Interactions as interdependent relationships  
Interactions as interdependent relationships occur when the effect of one factor on an 
outcome variable is dependent upon the effect of another factor. In terms of the 
person and situation, there is a non-interactive relationship when each exerts an 
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independent influence on behaviour (figure 2). A person-situation interaction occurs 
when the effect of the situation on behaviour depends upon the nature of the particular 
person in question (figure 3). That is, different individuals react differently to the 
same situation, with some individuals dispositionally more susceptible to 
criminogenic environments than others.  
 
Figures 2 and 3 about here 
 
Interaction used in this way is the same sense that the term is used in statistics. 
According to this usage, behaviour is a function of person and situation (behaviour = 
f[person, situation]) rather than merely the sum of their independent effects 
(behaviour = person + situation). To illustrate the point, imagine that the function 
describing the interaction between person and situation is a simple product (behaviour 
= person x situation). Imagine, too, that it is possible to accurately calibrate the 
criminal propensity of an individual and the criminogenic nature of a situation. Let us 
assign some arbitrary values to these two variables: individuals who are low on 
criminality are rated as one and individuals who are high on criminality are rated as 
five; likewise, situations that have low-criminogenic features are rated one and 
situations that have high-criminogenic features are rated five. The outcome of additive 
and multiplicative combinations of person and situation are shown in figures 1 and 2. 
In the additive, non-interactive condition an increase in the criminogenic nature of the 
environment has a uniform effect on both low- and high-criminality individuals. 
High-criminality individuals are always more likely to commit crime than are low-
criminality individuals and the difference between the two remains constant across 
situations. In the multiplicative, interactive condition high-criminality individuals are 
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marginally more likely than low-criminality individuals to commit crime in low-
criminogenic environments, and low-criminality individuals are marginally more 
likely to commit crime in high-criminogenic situations than in low-criminogenic 
situations. However, when high-criminality individuals enter high-criminogenic 
situations the conditions are created for the ‘perfect storm’. (Of course the exact shape 
of the lines in figures 1 and 2 depend on the initial values used to measure criminality 
and criminogenic situations, and the mathematical function describing the interactive 
relationship between them.) 
 
figure 4 & 5 about here 
 
Person x situation effects for crime have been demonstrated by Lynam, Caspi, Moffitt 
et al (2000). They took measures of impulsivity and self-reported delinquency from a 
sample of 508 inner-city boys aged 12-13 years. The researchers compared the 
relationship between these two measures as a function of the socio-economic 
characteristics of the neighbourhoods in which the boys lived. They found that the 
relationship between impulsivity and delinquency was stronger in poor 
neighbourhoods than in better-off neighbourhood, but that there was little difference 
in delinquency between non-impulsive adolescents in the poor and better-off 
neighbourhoods. A follow-up longitudinal study when the boys were 17 years 
confirmed these findings. Thus there is an interaction between impulsivity and 
adverse situational factors, and delinquency is especially likely when both are present. 
 
Not all behaviour involves a person-situation interaction. Psychologists use the term 
strong situations to refer to conditions in which the environmental forces are so 
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powerful as to induce uniformity of behaviour among individuals (Cooper & Withey 
2009). There are many situations in which most people behave in a law-abiding way 
irrespective of their dispositions. For example, almost everybody acts in the same 
reverential way at a funeral. On the other hand some situations can be overwhelming 
and induce ordinary people to commit crimes they would otherwise not contemplate 
committing. For example, the breakdown of order following natural disasters may 
lead to widespread looting that involves both antisocial and normally law-abiding 
individuals.   
 
The person x situation effect is explained by the specificity model of personality. 
According to the specificity model, while people do possess traits, trait differences 
between people only become meaningful in certain circumstances. Moreover, in some 
cases those circumstances can be very specific and encountered only occasionally. 
Consider the case of two friends, one with a high level of dispositional aggression and 
the other with a low level. They are chatting peaceably at a bar when they are 
accosted by a drunken patron. All other things being equal, the probability of an 
overtly aggressive response to this provocation will be higher for the aggressive friend 
than for the non-aggressive friend. The non-aggressive friend can probably also be 
induced to retaliate at some point, but it will take much stronger situational pressure 
for this to occur. At the same time, prior to the provocation, there was little outward 
difference in the behaviour of the two friends. The specificity model can help explain 
why individuals with criminal dispositions do not offend all of the time – and why 
they do offend when they do – as well as why normally law-abiding people can 
sometimes commit crimes that are apparently out of character.  
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Implications for situational crime prevention  
Person-situation interactions as reciprocal relationships have from the start formed a 
conceptual basis for situational crime prevention and little more needs to be said 
about them here. Person-situation interactions as interdependent relationships, 
however, have been examined in less detail and, if taken seriously, suggest that some 
account needs to be taken in situational crime prevention of offender dispositions. 
Going down this road represents a new direction for situational crime prevention, and 
has been something that Ron Clarke has consistently resisted.    
 
Of course, the interdependence of the person and situation in the commission of crime 
has not escaped situational crime prevention theorists. Cohen and Felson (1979) in 
their routine activity approach implicitly recognise the person x situation interaction 
in their description of the three necessary elements of a crime – a likely offender, a 
suitable target and the absence of a capable guardian. Felson (2002) describes the best 
candidate for a ‘likely’ offender as ‘a young male with a big mouth who gets into 
many accidents, does poorly in school, loses jobs, and makes many visits to the 
emergency room’ (p. 21). That is, whether crime occurs depends upon the 
convergence of a criminogenic situation (a suitable, unguarded target) and an 
individual with a predisposition to antisocial behaviour. In a similar vein, Ekblom 
(1994) discusses the ‘conjunction’ of proximal criminogenic elements that leads to 
crime. He notes that individuals do not encounter situations randomly and that high-
criminality individuals may actively seek out high-criminogenic environments. For 
example, young people attracted to excitement are likely to place themselves in inner-
city bars and discos where there is a relatively high potential to become an offender 
(or victim).  
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More recently, Cornish and Clarke (2003) delineated three types of offenders based 
on the strength of their criminal dispositions and the different roles played in their 
crimes by the immediate environment. The first type is the antisocial predator. These 
offenders possess ingrained criminal dispositions and actively seek-out or create 
criminal opportunities. They utilise situational data to make rational choices about the 
relative costs and benefits of criminal involvement. The second type is the mundane 
offender. These offenders are less criminally-committed than are antisocial predators, 
and engage in occasional, low-level crime. They may be defined by their inability to 
exercise self-restraint. They are opportunistic in their offending patterns, succumbing 
easily to the temptations offered in the situation. The third type is the provoked 
offender. Provoked offenders are conventional in their value-systems, and probably 
do not have a criminal record. Provoked offenders are reacting to a particular set of 
situational conditions – frustration, irritation, social pressures and so forth – that 
induce them to commit crimes that they would otherwise not commit. Their crimes 
include ‘crimes of violence that erupt in the heat of the moment; or impulsive ones 
committed by offenders overcome by temptation, or a temporary failure of self 
control’ (Cornish & Clarke 2003: p. 70).   
 
Cornish and Clarke’s typology can be interpreted in terms of the person-situation 
interaction by unpacking the dispositional and situational elements. Offenders vary in 
the strength of their criminality, from provoked offenders, through opportunists, to 
predators; situations vary in their criminogenic qualities, from those that challenge 
offenders by requiring them to create opportunities, through those that provide easy 
temptations, to those that actively provoke crime. The hypothetical interaction is 
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shown in figure 6. Notice that when interpreted in this way, offender types are not 
restricted to offending in the situational condition by which they are defined. 
Predatory offenders are most likely of the three types to offend in all three conditions. 
This brings to mind the case of one of Australia’s most notorious criminals, Neddy 
Smith, who was ultimately convicted of murdering a stranger in a road-rage incident.  
 
Figure 6 about here 
 
The question from a situational crime prevention point of view is not so much 
whether or not a person x situation interaction occurs but what is to be done about it. 
Cornish and Clarke are clearly reluctant to take the matter much further than the 
typology described above. They have had this to say:  
 
‘The rational choice perspective has had rather little to say about the nature of 
the offender. In accordance with good-enough theorising the original depiction 
of the offender was of an individual bereft of moral scruples – and without any 
defects such as lack of self-control that might get in the way of rational action. 
He (or she) was assumed to arrive at the crime setting already motivated and 
somewhat experienced in committing the crime in question, and to evaluate 
criminal opportunities on the basis of the likely rewards they offered, the 
effort they required, and the risks that were likely to involve. Although this 
picture has been modified over the years (Cornish and Clarke, 2003) the 
offender as antisocial predator has remained the perspective’s default view. 
There is a practical reason for this reluctance to qualify this bleak picture. In 
many cases situational crime prevention knows little or nothing about the 
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offenders whose activities it is trying to stop, reduce or disrupt. Under these 
circumstances the most effective measures may be those that credit the as yet 
identified offender with few qualities other than rationality.’ (Cornish and 
Clarke 2008: pp. 39-40)   
 
Cornish and Clarke are arguing for parsimony and pragmatism, and they have a point. 
Ron Clarke in particular has always been suspicious of traditional criminological 
approaches that treat the problem of crime as an academic exercise and that ultimately 
sink under the weight of their own theorising. His main goal has always been to 
produce a crime prevention model that above all is useful. And for a model to be 
useful it needs to be in a form that is easily communicated to the end-users who 
actually implement crime prevention strategies. There has been good reason not to 
complicate situational crime prevention with unnecessary theoretical baggage and 
there is no doubt that Clarke’s single-minded focus on utility has served his cause 
well. However, as Ken Pease and Gloria Laycock point out elsewhere in this volume, 
this approach also comes at a price. They argue that it has inhibited the integration of 
situational crime prevention into mainstream psychology and criminology and thus 
has limited the take-up of the ideas advanced. For my part I believe that situational 
crime prevention is now sufficiently well-established that it is safe to move beyond 
‘good-enough theorising’ without compromising Clarke’s original mission. To this 
end, exploring the person-situation interaction in more depth can provide a more 
sophisticated rendering of the intimate relationship between offenders and their crime 
scenes. My guess is that Ron Clarke would be happy enough for researchers to take 
up this line of enquiry as long as he does not have to be one of them.  
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Figure 1 Reciprocal relationship between person and situation. 
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Figure 2 Relationship between the person, situation and behaviour in the non-
interactive model 
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Figure 3 Relationship between the person, situation and behaviour in the interactive 
model 
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Figure 4. Probability of crime for a hypothetical person + situation model  
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Figure 5. Probability of crime for a hypothetical person x situation model 
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Figure 6 Hypothetical interaction between provoke, mundane and predatory offenders 
and the situation.  
